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Ititroduc t ion : the possibilities of stabilization policies 
During the nineteensixties activist demand-management policies, 
broadly called Keynesian policies, were officially adopted by the 
American government under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (see Tobin, 
1974). It didn't take long for Milton Friedman and other monetarists 
to attack them. At first the monetarists called their adversaries 
fiscalists, mistakenly, for the real conflict was not between fiscal 
and monetary policies but on the question whether activist demand 
management was useful of not, i.e. on the question of Rules vs. 
Discretion (cf. the discussion between Friedman and Heller, chairman 
of the Council of Economie Advisers 1961-'64, Friedman and Heller, 
1969, esp. p.47). 
Friedman gave the theoretical underpinnings of his anti-activist 
policy stand in his 1967 presidential address to'the American Economie 
Association (Friedman, 1969). In it he introduced the concept of the 
Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU), as an analogue to Wicksell's 
natural rate of interest. Though NRU is not much else than Keynesian 
fuil employment and Friedman's arguments boil down to the idea that 
the price mechanism functions satisfactorily, not a very new idea 
either, his article had a tremendous impact. It marked the end of 
the belief in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, as 
embodied in the Phillips curve. In Friedman's view, the Phillips 
curve is a short-run phenomenon only. Demand management can only 
exert a temporary influence on real variables, such as employment and 
real GNP. It does so by deceiving people. Higher aggregate demand 
drives prices up. Product prices go up faster than factor prices. 
Employers notice that real wages in terms of their own products fall 
and want to hire more labour. Employees notice that their wages are 
rising and do not immediately realize that prices in general are 
rising also. They are under the impression that real wages have 
risen and increase their supply of labour (Friedman, 1969, p.103-104). 
After some time the increase in prices affects expectations and un-
employment returns to NRU. There is an initial upward movement along 
a short-run Phillips-curve, foliowed by an upward shift of the short-
run Phillips-curve. The short-run Phillips-curve 
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W = aQ + aj/U (1) 
was modified by the addition of expectations as an argument: 
W = an +. a./U + a„W (2) 
U I z e 
where W = rate of change of money wages, U rate of unemployment, 
subscript e denotes expected values. Instead of W, E (prices) can 
be used. 
Sooner or later, economie agents will adjust their expectations to 
• • • • 
actual price and wage developments, such that W = W or P = P . 
As the monetarists put a„ = 1 , because rational economie agents 
do not suffer from money illusion, a unique equilibrium value for NRU 
follows: 
NRU = - a0/aj (3) 
At this value a vertical long-run Phillips curve can be drawn. 
A similar, though not identical, analysis was developed by Phelps. 
With Friedman the supply of labour is a positive function of (per-
ceived) real wages. With Phelps the supply of labour is independent 
of real wages. Unemployed people do not accept any wage offered by 
employers, however. They search for the best offer in the market and 
must weigh off the prospect of finding a better wage offer against 
the loss of income during the search period. When the government un-
expectedly stimulates demand, employers need more employees and are 
willing to pay better wages. Unemployed people spend less time 
looking for a job, for it proves now easier for them to see their 
wishes fulfilled. However, after some time employees realize that 
the wage at which they agreed to work is lower, relative to other 
wages, than they expected. They quit and start searching again. Un-
employment moves back to its original value (NRU, see Phelps, Intro-
duction in E.S. Phelps, a.o. 1971, for his famous island parable, 
where workers live on islands and have to row to other islands if 
they want to collect information on relative wages). 
With both Friedman and Phelps unemployment is voluntary. The impli-
cation of their analyses is that contractionary policy measures, taken 
to combat inflation, will only have transitory negative effects on 
employment. After a short period of time expectations adjust and the 
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economy returns to NRU. They do not consider the possibility that 
markets do not function as they should and that the economy remains 
stuck to the rlght of the vertical long-run Phillips curve or that 
destabilizing (multiplier) processes move it furhter and further away 
from NRU. Policy measures to correct temporary random deviations 
from NRU are not very useful either, in Friedman's eyes, as they work 
with long and variable lags and therefore are as likely as not to 
have their full impact after the deviation has disappeared by itself. 
Whatever one may think of Friedman's and Phelps' analysis and its 
implication that unemployment is voluntary, their idea that people's 
expectations (price expectations in this case) must be taken account 
of and that those adjust to actual (price) developments, was a very 
fruitful one and has been generally adopted by the profession. 
Friedman and Phelps left some scope for macroeconoraic demand manage-
ment, by exploiting economie actors' lack of full information, that 
is, by fooling people. As Friedman put it, quoting Abraham Lincoln: 
'you can fooi all of the people some of the time, you can fooi some 
of the people all of the time, but you can't fooi all of the people 
all of the time' (Friedman, 1976, p.223). If NRU represents a kind 
of Walrasian equilibrium, which is clearly what Friedman had in mind, 
then it would be suboptimal to reduce unemployment below NRU anyway. 
The adherents of the idea of 'rational expectations', which gained 
increasing acceptance during the 'seventies, go one step further. 
They deny that you can fooi people at all, at least not systematicalLy. 
This view gave rise to the New Classical Macroeconomics School, which 
essentially denies any influence from systematic macro-economic policy 
on real variables. lts adherents consider the experience of the 
1970's after the 1973 oil crisis, where increasing and high rates of 
inflation went together with increasing unemployment, a concluding 
verdict on the applicability of Keynesian ideas (cf. Lucas, 1981, 
p.559-560). 
The following is a review of rational expectations and the New Classi-
cal Macroeconomics (NCME). Special attention will be paid to the 
assumption of market clearing and to the reinterpretation of history 
by NCME adherents. 
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The concept of rational expectations and NCME 
In his now famous 1961 article, which was first neglected for a decade 
or so, Muth proposed that expectations are 'essentially the same as 
the predictions of the relevant economie theory' (Muth, 1961, p.315). 
His hypothesis was, more precisely, that 'expectations of firms (or, 
more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) 
tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the pre-
diction of the theory (or the 'objective' probability distribution 
of outcomes)' (Muth, 1961, p.316). 
Muth argued that, if expectations were not moderately rational, there 
would be opportunities for economists to make profits in commodity 
speculation, running a firm, or selling the information to present 
owners (Muth, 1961, p.330). More generally the appeal of Muth's 
rational exp.ectations hypothesis (REH) is that it is quite reasonable 
to suppose that economie agents use all available information in such 
a way that they are not systematically wrong. People do not have 
perfect foresight, but errors are not serially correlated. This sets 
rational expectations apart from adaptive expectations, which lay 
behind much empirical work on inflation and interest rates and also 
behind much of Friedman's work. With a continuously increasing or 
decreasing rate of inflation, adaptive expectations, of the form 
tXt+l " t-lXt " * (xt " t-lxt) 0 < X < 1 (4) 
jX is the value of x expected for period t at the ênd of period 
fc
 t-1 
would systematically underestimate respectively overestimate the rate 
of inflation. It is surely to be expected that people will not 
persist making this kind of error. 
It has been argued that REH expects too much of economie agents. They 
must be a kind of human electronic computer: they have an economie 
model, know the actual probability distributions which govern the 
behaviour of the model, believe it to be accurate, know the true 
coefficients, and know how to solve them. Furthermore, they have a 
consistent set of forecasts with regard to the future values of the 
exogenous variables and error terms in the model (Forman, 1980, p.38). 
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Though there niay be something in this (see below, Chapter 9), it is 
not a definitive objection. We do not have to believe that all econo-
mie agents proceed in this way, no more than we have to assume that 
profit maximizing firms actually evaluate marginal cost and revenue 
curves. In the words of Begg, if we want to model expectations 
formation in a model in which information is widely and speedily dis-
seminated, in which reputable forecasts are published, and in which 
expectations are not systematically mistaken, this can best be done 
'as if' agents know the model and perform all the required thought 
experiments (cf. Begg, 1982, p.30). In passing, I may refer to 
Machlup's defense of marginal analysis with his famous example of a 
car driver who has to decide if he will overtake a truck in front of 
him. Though this driver does not consciously perform all the required 
calculations as to speed and distance, a theory explaining his beha-
viour would have to take account of all the relevant factors (Machlup, 
1967, p.166-167). In other words, the analysis proceeds 'as if' the 
driver actually performed all the calculations. For Friedman this 
idea was the basis Of his 'methodology of positive economics' (Fried-
man, 1953, Part I). 
Muth applied the concept of KEH to speculative behaviour and to the 
cobweb cycle. Following Lucas (1972), however, REH has been applied 
not to individual markets, but to macroeconomic systems. The central 
question became the extent to which governments can influence real 
variables by means of macro-economie demand management. REH adherents 
put forward the idea that macro-economie demand policies have no 
influence on real variables (an idea that is becoming more qualified). 
They based this idea of policy-ineffectiveness upon REH coupled with 
the assumption of continuous market clearing. .So here was a renewed 
attack upon Keynesian demand management, with its underlying idea 
that markets, especially the labour market, do not always automatical-
ly clear. The application of REH, combined with the idea of continu-
ous market clearing, is known as New Classical Macroeconomics (NCME). 
NCME can be viewed as a further development of Friedman's doctrine 
that the Phillips curve is a short-run phenomenon. For NCME there is 
no short-run Phillips curve, because you can't systematically fooi 
people. Tobin therefore coined the expression 'Monetarism, Mark II' 
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for NCME (Tobin, 1980a, p.xiii). NCME is meant to reinforce the 
monetarists' stand against activist macro-economic demand management. 
Policy-ineffectiveness 
The message of NCME is that macro-economic stabilization policies are 
generally ineffective, with the emphasis on monetary policy. I will 
now first give the base model used to illustrate the policy-ineffective-
ness proposition, then discuss the causes of ineffectiveness, after 
that toughupon fiscal policy and finally pay attention "to superneutrality. 
i) The_aggregate_su£oly__function and_£olicy_ ineffectiveness 
The starting point of models that show policy ineffectiveness 
is an aggregate supply function of the so-called Sargent-Wallace 
variety (cf. Minford and Peel, 1981), where deviations of output 
from some trend, apart from random shocks, can only be caused by 
divergences between actual and expected prices. A typical formu-
lation is: 
*lm*n + *\ ( p t " t - i V + u i , t ai > 0 ( 5 ) 
g 
where y = the log of real output at time t 
y = the log of the natural rate of output, corresponding ' 
with NRU 
P = the log of the price level at time t 
P = the price level at time t expected at t-1 
u = a serially uncorrelated random disturbance with 
mean zero. 
Essentially, this is a reformulation of the Phillips curve as a 
supply function: if actual prices correspond with expected prices, 
unemployment is at NRU and production is at the 'natural' level, 
apart from random disturbances. The economy is on the long-run, 
vertical Phillips curve. Deviations only occur because of price 
surprises, as in the micro-economie approaches of Friedman and 
Phelps. 
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Now assume that aggregate demand is established in agreement with 
the quantity theory: 
? t = M t - P t + u 2 , t (6) 
where y = the log of aggregate demand at time t. 
Under the assumption that commodity markets clear, it follows from 
(5) and (6) that: 
y n + al ( P t - t - l V + U l , t = M t - P t + U 2 5 t 
o r : 
y n + (l + a 1 ) P t - a 1 . t _ 1 P t + u ] j t = Mt + u 2 j t 
and: 
M + a, . ,P - y - u, + u„ 
P - t 1 t-1 t yn l , t 2,t
 m 
*t ; i +
 3 ] •
 U} 
From (7) we can construct the value of P expected at the end of 
period t-1 . We start from the assumption that the money supply 
is a constant or that the money supply grows following a fixed 
rule, such that ,M = M . Furthermore, note that t-1 t t 
E^ .( ,P_) = _ ,P^ , where E , denotes expectations taken t-1 t-1 t t-1 t t-1 
at time t-1 . We find that: 
Mt + Vt-l Pt-yn 
P = _± : — - (8) 
t-1 t 1 + a 
(Note that E ,(u ) and E , (u9 ^) a r e DY definition zero.) 
From (7) and (8) it follows that: 
U2 t " Ul t 
Pt " t-lPt = ' l + a ) ' (9) 
Substitution of (9) into (5) shows that deviations of output 
from the 'natural' level are completely random. 
Let us now assume that the monetary authorities decide to pursue 
an activist monetary policy, for instance according to a propor-
tional feedback rule (increasing the money supply when output 
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lies below the natural level and decreasing it in the opposite 
case): 
Mt = Mn + a2(yt-l - y n } + U3,t (10) 
where M = the trend value of the money supply, and u„ is, 
again, a serially uncorrelated random variable with mean zero, 
introduced because of the idea that the authorities are unable to 
completely control the money supply. 
The rational expectations hypothesis implies that economie actors 
will lose little time in discering the policy rule foliowed by 
the authorities. Their rational expectation of the money supply 
in period t at the end of t-1 will be: 
t-lMt " Mn + a2(^t-l - V (11> 
(12) 
Instead of (6) we get: 
£ = Mn + a2(yt-l-yn)-Pt + U2,t + U3,t 
and instead of (7): 
M + a„(yt ,-y ) + a. . ,P -y -u. + u„ t + u„ t n 2 ;t-l Jn lt-lt Jn l,t 2,t 3,t 
t 1 + a 
Using (11) and taking expectations, we find that: 
M + a „ ( y - y ) + a , . , P - y 
n 2 v ^ t - l yrvJ l t - l t yn , _-. 
t - 1 t 1 + a U ; 
a n d : 
~
U
 1 t + U2 t + U 3 t 
P t - t - l P t = ' l + l \ ~ • ( 1 4 ) 
Monetary policy according to a rule has no systematic influence 
on real variables. Economie actors take account of the policy 
rules foliowed by the authorities and prices cannot systematicalLy 
be brought to deviate from expected prices. The monetary 
authorities can only influence real output and employment by 
engineering surprise shocks in money growth. One corrollary of 
this line of thought is that the authorities do in some special 
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cases have the opportunity to increase real output for a short 
period, namely if they have foliowed some rule for the money 
supply for a long time and unexpectedly change for another rule. 
If such a move could not be expected by the public, there will be 
a large initial effect on real output and employment. But it 
will fade away, and frequent policy changes will fail to delude 
the public. So there may be a short-run Phillips-curve after all, 
but it tends to disappear if the authorities want to exploit it 
(see Lucas, 1973, for empirical research for 18 countries over the 
period 1951-1967). 
In parentheses, it may be remarked that in this kind of models 
stabilization policies are strictly useless. Deviations of output 
are serially uncorrelated, so there is no point in taking measures 
during one period with an eye to disturbances that have occurred 
one period earlier. Useless or not, policy is ineffective, and 
it is also impossible systematically to reduce unemployment below 
NRU. This would be possible with adaptive expectations by 
continuously increasing the rate of inflation, but would be equal-
ly useless provided NRU is seen as representing some kind of 
optimum. 
ii) Wh£EÊ_l2ËË_E2li£Z_iBË£££c£^v2nêsË come_froni? 
In models such as the above only surprise price shocks can move 
the economy from NRU, that is, from the vertical long-run 
Phillips- curve. The reason is the very same one as given by 
Friedman (1969). The microeconomic foundation of Sargent-Wallace-
type aggregate supply functions is a Walrasian general equilibrium 
system. Economie agents are price takers. But the Walrasian 
auctioneer does not function flawlessly. There is no fuil 
information. Suppliers receive information about the prices of 
their own goods or services (including labour services) faster 
than they receive information about the aggregate price level. 
They initially misinterpret surprise increases in the aggregate 
price level as relative price increases of the goods or services 
they supply, and therefore increase their supply (cf. Sargent and 
Wallace, 1975, p.242). 
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Systematic government policy does not generate unexpected price 
shocks, provided the government has no superior knowledge about 
the economy. If the government does have superior knowledge, it , 
can react to deviations before the public discerns themand, 
therefore, before the public knows of the policy reaction of the 
authorities. Such policies will then have real results. It has 
been argued that an informational advantage of the government is 
improbable, because all relevant information is available to the 
public without much delay (cf. Grossman, 1980, p.13, Wagner, 1981, 
p.5). On the other hand, if the government really did have an 
informational advantage, it could, instead of using it for acti-
vist policy measures, make the information available to the public 
(McCallum, 1980a, p.43). So the case for policy activism, based 
upon an informational advantage of the government, is weak. 
It is not surprising that there is not much scope for stabiliza-
tion policies in this kind of models. The Walrasian system of 
equations grinds out a unique equilibrium level of employment, 
NRU, corresponding to a unique equilibrium level of output. 
Deviations from equilibrium are either random or caused by false 
price expectations. Government can only try to discern deviations 
earlier than the public and try to correct them, or try to fooi 
people, which is suboptimal. 
There would be more scope for stabilization policies if there 
were no continuous market clearing. A promising literature has 
cropped up on explicit and implicit contracts, where it is argued 
that it may be rational for economie agents to make multiperiod 
contracts and to forgo the possibility of making price adjust-
ments for a period of time (see below). 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that slight alterations to the 
model discussed above may be sufficiënt to restore the effective-
ness of stabilization policies, in the sense that they may reduce 
the variance of output, even under rational expectations. E.g., 
Minford and Peel (1981a) show that with a Lucas-type supply 
function, i.e. with the term (P^ -
 t ,P ) replaced by 
' t t-1 t 
(P -t._1I)t.,1) » and a lagged value of output added to the supply 
function, the authorities can reduce the variance of output, at 
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the cost of increasing the variance of the price level. Unfortu-
nately, theirs is only a mathematical exercise, they do not 
provide an economie explanation. It seems that there must be 
some form of lag, which carries disturbances over from one period 
to the next, and that there must be forward expectations which 
rule current behaviour and which can be influenced by the autho-
rities. Asako (1982) developed a model where lagged values do 
not figure, but where current supply and démand depend upon the 
difference between current prices and expected future prices 
respectively current money supply and expected future prices, 
while current prices also are influenced by expected future 
prices, and vice versa. Expected future prices are dependent 
upon the money-supply rule and different money-supply rules turn 
out to result in different values of the variance of output. 
Incidentally, a Lucas-type supply function is based upon the idea 
that suppliers of labour substitute present for future labour if 
perceived current real wages increase relative to expected future 
real wages (cf. Chapter 5). 
So with slight alterations to the basic Sargent-Wallace model, 
the monetary authorities can influence the variance of output, 
but not the expected value of output. Shiller has argued that 
this result follows from the linear nature of the supply function 
(Shiller, 1978, p.10). If the authorities can influence the 
variance of the difference between actual and expected prices, 
and output depends in a non-linear way upon this difference, the 
expected value of output (its average level) is influenced by the 
authorities. 
In cases where monetary policy measures do not have any influence 
on the probability distribution of output, fiscal policy measures 
are ineffective too (cf. McCallum and Whitaker, 1979). But this 
conclusion is not valid for built-in stabilizers. They work 
automatically, and are not dependent upon an information advantage 
of the authorities. E.g., tax receipts react immediately to out-
put changes, without anybody having to take action. By varying 
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the caracteristics of the built-in stabilizers, the authorities 
can influence variability in output. 
Model builders are extremely resourceful. Shiller (1978, p.10-13) 
has developed a model in which monetary policy is ineffective, 
but fiscal policy works: 
V^n + a(Vt-lV (15) 
4 = bl +Vt + b3 Gt + b4 Zt + Ul,t
 TQ
(16) 
IS-curve 
Mt = Pt + c y + c2rt + u (17) 
LM-curve 
where r = rate of interest, 
G = government expenditures 
Z^ = exogenous variable t 
By eliminating r from (16) and (17), and subsequently y 
from (15), we find for P : 
Pt - J(l + b 2 ci / c2 ) ( a-t-l Pt~ yn ) + Jbl + J(b2/c2)Mt + 
+ Jb„G^ + Jb.Z^ - J(b„/c„)u9 f + Ju, (18) 
3 t 4 t 2 2 2, t l,t 
J = l/(a + ab2c]/c2+ b2/c2) . 
Assumine that Z , y and ,P are known at the end of time 
° t ' ;n t-1 t 
t-1, we take expectations: 
t - l P t " J ( 1 + b 2 C l / c 2 ) ( a ' t - l P t - V + Jhl+J(h2/cl\-l\ + 
+ J b 3 ' t - l G t + J b 4 - t - l Z t 0 9 ) 
where ,Z = Z 
t -1 t t 
S u b t r a c t i n g (19) from (18) we f i n d : 
P t - t - l P t " J<V c2 ) ( M t - t - lV + ^ 3^-t-lV + 
- J ( b 2 / c 2 ) u 2 5 t + j u . (20) 
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With known monetary and fiscal policy rules, M = , M and 
J
 r J
 ' t t-1 t 
G = _1G , barring error terras, so systematic policy is unable 
to influence production. Nonetheless, Shiller sees a way to 
modify the model in such a way that budgetary policy does help to 
stabilize y, even if monetary policy remains powerless. To that 
end, he reformulates the LM-equation, (17), as follows: 
Mt = Pt + Clyt + / ( r ) (21) 
where f(r) = 0 over a region in the vicinity of an interest rate 
r , which means that near r money demand is interest-inelastic 
and the LM-curve runs vertically. The LM-function has now become 
non-linear. If now movements in Z are large and forecastable, 
and movements in u are very small, the authorities are able to 
keep the system on the vertical section of the LM-curve by using 
G to offset changes in Z . As long as u. is so small as not to 
disturb the system out of the vertical section of the LM-curve, 
these randon distrubances will only affect r, and not y or P. 
iv) Sugerneutralitv 
Even if monetary policy is ineffective with regard to stabiliza-
tion, it may yet influence the long-run growth path of the 
economy by virtue of the Tobin, or Mundell-Tobin effect (cf. 
Tobin, 1965, Mundell, 1963, 1971, Chapter 2). An increase in 
money growth will raise the rate of inflation. This makes holding 
real capital more attractive relative to holding money. Invest-
ment is stimulated and per capita production moves to a higher 
level. This effect can be included in rational expectations 
models by making y a function of the capital stock, distin-
guishing between consumption and investment in the aggregate 
demand (IS) equation and making consumption a function of real 
balances. In the LM-equation, real balances, In M minus In P , 
then have to be a function of the rate of inflation. A change in 
(the trend rate of) money growth will then change y or the 
growth path of y (cf. Fischer, 1979, Begg, 1982, pp.143-149); 
see for an analysis of what happens between the announcement and 
the implementation of a new growth rate of the money supply Boyer 
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and Hodisch, 1982). Without such a real balance effect there is 
superneutrality, which means that systematic policy can influence 
neither short-term movements of real output around trend nor trend 
growth itself (Begg calls this the Strong Neutrality Theorem, and 
ineffectiveness with regard to stabilization policies the Weak 
Neutrality Theorem (Begg, 1982, p.143)). 
With fiscal policy, superneutrality will be the exception rather 
than the rule. Tax rates influence, e.g., labour supply and 
saving decisions, government expenditures may directly affect the 
rate of capital formation etc. All this will influence the 
natural rate of unemployment and the natural level of national 
income or its growth path. This has nothing to do with cyclical 
policy, but with changes in microeconomic excess demand functions 
in the general equilibrium system which determine the equilibrium 
price and quantity vectors. 
Policy effectiveness because of the absence of continuous 
market clearing 
If there is no continuous market clearing, there is more scope for 
stabilizing macro-economie policies. Some form of price stickiness 
is called for. One way is to introducé contracts, especially wage 
contracts, that fix prices or wages for a period during which the 
monetary authorities can react to new information. The public then 
can perfectly well forecast what policies the authorities will follow, 
but it is not able to react to these policies, because it is bound by 
contracts that cover at least two periods. A fine example is the 
model developed by Fischer (1977a) in which at the end of each period 
new wage contracts are drawn up for one half of the working popula-
tion for the next two periods. Another feature of the model is that 
there is some serial correlation in dis turbances, which means that it 
makes sense for the authorities to react to disturbances with 
measures that only become effective during the next period. 
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All kinds of variations are possible. E.g., in Phelps and Taylor 
(1977) prices and wages are set before the money supply is decided 
upon, and inventories carry disturbances from one period to the next. 
This makes countercyclical monetary policy both possible and useful. 
In cases such as these, it is not true that a fixed money supply rule 
is optimal when the expectations of the public are rational, nor is 
it true that monetary policy which follows a feed-back rule is only 
optimal when the public's expectations are not rational (see fof such 
a proposition Korteweg 1976a, p.500). 
The discussion on policy ineffectiveness is still going on, the dust 
has not completely cleared yet. E.g., one of the most ardent 
advocates of the idea of policy ineffectiveneness, Bennett T.McCallum, 
proposed that stabilization policies may be ineffective even if there 
is no instantaneous market clearing (McCallum, 1977). McCallum 
modified the model of Sargent and Wallace (Sargent and Wallace, 1975), 
which consisted of a Sargent-Wallace supply function, an aggregate 
demand function incorporating the expected real rate of interest, and 
an LM-equation, by introducing a weak form of price stickiness. The 
commodity price adjusts to the market-clearing value in any period 
only if there is a substantial discrepancy between expected and 
actual market-clearing prices. McCallum finds that countercyclical 
demand policy has no output effects in this case. In my view, this 
in no way negates the results of Fischer (1977a) and Phelps and 
Taylor (1977). The point is that in McCallum's model there is no 
serial correlation of disturbances. The authorities only react to 
past disturbances, but as these are not related to present disturban-
ces, their activities are useless. Moreover, it has been argued that 
McCallum's model presupposes illogical behaviour by businessmen 
(R.J. Gordon, 1981, p.511). With sticky prices the quantity demanded 
may diverge from the quantity supplied (in Fischer's model this 
problem was circumvented by making wages, not prices, sticky). Now 
if demand management causes demand to deviate from supply, inventories 
are accumulated or decumulated. Policy ineffectiveness then presup-
poses that businessmen do not react to inventory changes, which is 
not very realis tic. 
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This does not mean that no models can be constructed with both policy 
ineffectiveness and non-clearing markets. One example is the model 
developed by McCafferty (1982). McCafferty argues that with non-
clearing markets (which exist because of the costs of recontracting), 
the authorities can successfully conduct stabilizing policies only if 
they have better information than the public or if labour contracts 
are set in nominal terms for periods longer than the time needed for 
changes in policy, as in Fischer (1977a) and Phelps and Taylor (1977). 
The ingenuity of model builders is almost without limits. 
5. Business cycles 
For some reason or another the opposition of NCME adherents to 
countercyclical policies is so fierce as to resemble a jihad. Apart 
from arguing that systematic policy may be ineffective even without 
continuous market clearing, they have spent a great deal of effort to 
explain business cycles in a context of continuous market clearing. 
If deviations of current market-clearing output or employment from 
trends are nothing but random fluctuations, equilibrium output or 
employment itself must show cyclical movements, given the phenomenon 
of business cycles. One way to explain such movements is to take 
recourse to exogenous impulses. Technology changes may make marginal 
productivity schedules, and therefore labour demand curves, move, and 
changing preference between work and leisure may make the supply curve 
of labour move. But, as Tobin (1980a, p.37, 1981, p.37) notes, there 
is no reason why such moves should be auto-regressive (see also 
Lucas, 1977, p.20). NCME adherents are forced to explain the parallel 
movement of prices and quantities that characterizes the business 
cycle from imperfect information (Tobin, 1980b, pp.789-790, Tobin, 
1981, p.38, Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer, 1983, p.281). They have 
to fa11 back upon a confusion between changes in price relationships 
and changes in the general price level, as in Friedman (1969), or a 
confusion between permanent and transitory shocks, or both,plus some 
mechanism to transmit disturbances from one period to another. Such 
a mechanism can be found in time delays in information, costs of 
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adjusting output decisions once taken or the influence of durable 
goods or inventories on production during next periods (Laidler, 1981, 
pp.11-12). 
The need to distinguish between (perceived) temporary and permanent 
price shocks has been stressed by Lucas (1977). Starting from the 
idea that the supply of labour is not very elastic with respect to 
real wages, he argued that higher perceived relative wages can only 
serve to increase the labour supply if labour suppliers believe that 
the increase will be temporary. In his view, the small premium 
required to induce workers to shift holidays and vacations is suffi-
ciënt proof that leisure in one period is a good substitute for 
leisure in other, nearby periods. Introducing durable goods, Lucas 
noted that current relative price movements have their maximal effect 
on capital accumulation when they are regarded as permanent, for 
investment decisions will not be taken on the basis of price movements 
that are only believed to be short-lived. Therefore, in order to make 
both investment and employment move systematically in the direction 
of relative price movements, such movements must be viewed as a 
mixture of permanent and transitory relative price changes. 
If, because of incorrect price perceptions, investment is increased, 
there will be a downturn during subsequent periods, because producers 
want to reduce capacity again and therefore invest less for a time 
(cf. Lucas, 1975, and Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Adding inventories 
to the model will give similar results. An unanticipated change in 
the general price level, interpreted in part as a relative price 
change, will make firms increase sales and raise both production and 
sales out of inventory. In subsequent periods inventories are gradu-
ally built up again and output will be higher for a time than it 
otherwise would have been (Blinder and Fischer, 1931, Brunner, 
Cukierman and Meltzer, 1983, p.283). 
Both Lucas (1977, p.23 nt. 15) and Laidler (1981, p.12) have noted 
the similarity between this kind of models and Austrian business 
cycle theory. In both, the business cycle is caused by spurious price 
signals. The difference is, as Lucas noted, that the Austrians 
stressed interest rates, not product prices. But in both cases the 
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business cycle is caused by incomplete information, not by market 
failures. Persistence effects may also be explained by introducing 
adjustment costs, which includes the costs of bringing the capital 
stock and inventories back to their equilibrium or trend values. The 
aggregate supply function then takes the form: 
yt = a ( p t - t - i p t ) + i S i b y t - i + u t 
(cf. McCallum, 1979c, p.241). 
The upshot of these 'equilibrium' theories of the business cycle is 
that demand management policies are useless and that the best that 
government can do, apart from taking measures in the microeconomic 
sphere to improve the efficiency of markets, is to stabilize money 
growth. But neither the explanation of business cycles nor the policy 
prescription seem ÉQ be well-founded. 
As R.J. Gordon (1981, p.510) notes, rational economie agents will not 
rush to place investment orders on the slightest evidence that price 
relationships change. They will have noticed that in the past price 
shocks have been erroneously perceived as relative price changes and 
given the considerable time it costs to draw up and implement invest-
ments programmes, they will think it wise to spend some time on 
collecting information on the character and underlying causes of the 
price shock. 
Another point is that, as models become more complicated, more scope 
for monetary policies appears to be possible. In Blinder and 
Fischer's (1981) inventory model, for instance, monetary policy may 
influence the real rate of interest and with interest-sensitive 
desired inventories, even fully-foreseen monetary policy will 
influence real variables. 
Reinterpretation of history 
In equilibrium models of the business cycle, fluctuations in employ-
ment are not deviations from NRU, but deviations j ^ NRU, apart from 
random disturbances. Now some courage is needed to view the unemploy-
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ment of the nineteenthirties as voluntary unemployment. NQIE proponents, 
such as Darby and Benjamin and Kochin, do have this courage. 
Darby argues that the slow recovery of employment in the U.S. during 
the period 1934-1941, after the shock of the 1929-1933 depression, is 
a fiction. . The data are, in his view, erroneous. During the period 
1934 through 1940 five to seven percent of the labour force was 
employed in public construction works, undertaken with the view to 
increase employment. These people were officially counted as un-
employed, but in fact were not, according to Darby. His main point 
is that these people would have been employed anyway. If government 
agencies had not hired them, private industry would have. In other 
words, the emergency programs 'crowded out' regular employment. This 
argument rests on the finding that 'there is little empirical evidence 
in the postwar period that the government spending multiplier is 
much above zero over such a long period as 2 or 3 years' (Darby 1976, 
p. 14). But the value of the (real) government multiplier in a 
near-full employment economy can heardly be anything else than near-
zero and gives no clue as to its value in a depression economy. 
Moreover, even if we accept Darby:s calculations, the minimum un-
employment rate during the 1934-1940 period, reached in 1937, turns 
out to be 9.2 per cent instead of 14.3 per cent, and is still extreme-
ly high by pre-1980 post-war standards. Add to this that the average 
wage received by government employees in the emergency relief pro-
grammes during the 1934-1940 period was 46.3 per cent of the average 
private sector wage5 not much different from the 48,6 per cent ratio 
of unemployment compensation benefits to average after-tax earnings 
in 1971 (R.J. Gordon 1976, p. 195), then it should be clear that un-
employment during the 'thirties can hardly be called voluntary, no 
news to anyone who is not tied to his or her computer terminal. As 
Modigliani remarked, commenting on a model by Sargent (1976d)for 
the post-war American economy, where Sargent assumed that large and 
persistent fluctuations in employment merely reflect corresponding 
swings in the natural rate itself: 'In other words, what happened to 
the U.S. in the 1930's was a severe attack of contagious laziness' 
(Modigliani 1977, p. 6) 
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A similar analysis to that by Darby for the U.S. has been conducted by 
Benjamin and Kochin for the U.K. (Benjamin and Kochin 1979a, b). They 
assert that, if the British unemployment insurance system in the 
interbellum had been no more generous than it was in 1913, unemploy-
ment would have averaged seven per cent instead of 14 per cent 
(Benjamin and Kochin 1979a, p. 36, 1982 p. 434). Against this it 
has been argued that the prewar unemployment benefit system was less 
generous than that of the postwar period, which until recently had 
much lower rates of unemployment. So the high level of unemployment 
between the wars cannot have been caused by unemployment benefits 
alone (Metcalf, Nickell and Floros 1982, pp. 387-393). Moreover, 
doubt has been expressed as to the validity of Benjamin and Kochin's 
research methodology (see Ormerod and Worswick 1982, Collins 1982). 
Also, they overlooked the fact that quite severe 'genuinely seeking 
work' and 'means-test' clauses were used in the interwar period in 
Britain, to the effect that those who voluntarily opted for un-
employment could not easily qualify for receiving benefits. 
7. Empirical testing of rational expectations 
There have been a few direct tests of rational expectations. When 
expectations are formed rationally, the expected forecast error, 
conditional on any subset of information available when the forecast 
was made, is zero. Data from direct sample measures of inflation 
expectations, the best-known of which are those by Carlson and 
Parkin for the U.K. (Carlson and Parkin 1975), and by the Michigan 
Research Center and the financial journalist Joseph Livingston for the 
U.S., consistently under-predict the actual rate of inflation. 
Pesando (1975), using the Livingston data, defined price expectations 
as rational if they fully incorporate the information contained in 
current and past rates of inflation. For econometrie testing this 
implies that expectations must be both efficiënt and consistent. 
Forecasts are efficiënt if one-period forecasts and realizations share 
a common autoregressive pattern: 
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P„ = .1. a.P. . + u. ^  
t i=l ï t-i i,t 
n 
,. .P,. = I b.ï\ . + u„ . t-1 t i=] ï t-i 2,t 
Efficiency requires that a. = b. for all i, which means that 
expectations should be generated by the same process that generates 
the variable to be forecast. Forecasts are consistent if the multi-
period forecasts are obtained recursively, with the rational forecasts 
being substituted for the as yet unobserved realization of the series. 
It was found that the information utilized in the 6-month forecasts 
was not applied consistently to generate 12-month forecasts. The 
latter showed a large downward bias. In a similar testby Hafer and 
Resler (1980) efficiency was rejected for 6-month forecasts over the 
period 1959-1978 (though not for the relatively stable subperiod 
1959-1969), but for 12-month forecasts efficiency was not rejected, 
though they were biased. 
In other tests REH did not fare any better. Benjamin Friedman (1980) 
studied data from quarterly surveys of interest rate expectations, 
conducted since September, 1969, by The Goldsmith-Nagan Bond and 
Money Market Letter. Both efficiency and consistency were rejected by 
the data. Moreover, respondents failed, when predicting long-term 
interest rates, to exploit efficiently the information contained in 
data on unemployment, growth of industrial production, inflation and 
the federal government deficit. Finally, Stein concluded from studies 
and data on commodity and foreign exchange future contracts that 
anticipations systematically lag behind sub_sequently realized prices 
during periods of rising or falling prices, which points in the 
direction of adaptive rather than rational expectations (Stein, 1981, 
pp. 140-141). 
It has been argued that information lags and shocks extending over 
several periods may generate autocorrelated errors, even though the 
underlying forecasting process is consistent with REH. Ingenious 
tests based upon this idea have been made, but the results do not 
seem encouraging for REH (cf Chan-Lee, 1980, esp. pp. 68-70). 
22 
And then survey responses do not necessarily reflect the anticipations 
of actual buyers and sellers of goods and securities. 
Apart from direct tests, there can only be joint tests of NRU and RHE. 
As Buiter (1980, p. 38) notes+ the hypothesis appears to be in danger 
of being consistent with any conceivable body of empirical evidence, 
because the assumption of optimal use of the available information 
cannot be tested independently of an assumption about the available 
information set. By suitable redefinition of the information set 
conditioning the forecast, any pattern of serial correlation in the 
endogenous variables of a model can be rationalised as consistent with 
Muth-rational expectations. 
It must be admitted that the claims made by NCME adherents are not 
always extravagant. Sargent (197Ód)tested and estimated a small 
model for the U.S. for the period 1951-1 through 1973-III based upon 
the idea that unemployment, output and the rate of interest are econo-
metrically exogenous with respect to variables measuring monetary 
and fiscal policies. Sargent concluded that "the empirical results 
provide some evidence that the causal structure imposed on the data 
by the classical model (...) is not obscenely at variance with the 
data"(Sargent 1976d p. 233). The tests did not convincingly reject 
the hypothesis that monetary and fiscal policies do no cause un-
employment or the interest rate. On the other hand, Sargent found that, 
in contrast to the NRU hypothesis, money wages played a role in 
causing unemployment and the long-term interest rate. 
A number of tests have been made of the reactionof prices and output to 
expected and unexpected money growth, respectively. Wogin (1980) 
estimated a monetary policy feedback rule for Canada for the period 
1927-1972 in order to identify the amount of unexpected monetary 
growth. The systematic component of money growth. played no significant 
role, but the unexpected component had significant negative effects on 
unemployment, as did federal spending and exports. Similarly, 
Attfield, Demerey and Duck found for the period 1963-1978 that out-
put in the U.K. economy was affected only by unanticipated money 
growth, not by the systematic part of money growth. Similar results 
have been found by Barro (1977a) for the U.S. for the period 1941-
1973. The current and two annual lag values of unanticipated money 
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growth were shown to have considerable explanatory value for un-
employment. A later article (Barro 1978) extended these results 
to output and the price level. Barro found a one-to-one, contempora-
neous link between anticipated money growth and the price level, 
while the price response to unanticipated money supply movements had 
a longer lag than the output response. Again, Barro and Rush (1980), 
using both annual data for the 1941-1977 period and quarterly data 
for 1941-1 through 1978-1, found that aggregate output and employment 
responded to unpredictable money growth but not to predictable money 
growth. However, the response with quarterly data was different from 
annual data and the pattern of response of prices to unpredictable 
money growth did not seem to be consistent with the pattern of 
response of output. Like Wogin for Canada, Bomhoff (1979, Ch.4) found 
for the Netherlands over the 1953-1976 period that anticipated money 
growth determined inflation, whereas unanticipated money growth had 
a significant influence on the deviation of actual from planned out-
put growth, together with foreign impulses and government expenditure. 
Less positive results for NCME came out of research by Driscoll, 
Ford, Mullineux and Sen (1983) for the U.K. over the postwar period 
through 1979. They maintain that structural neutrality (the idea that 
deviations from market-clearing, natural rates of output, employment, 
etc. occur only because of random shocks or unanticipated policy 
changes) implies REH, but REH does not imply structural neutrality. 
Now the likelihood ratio tests of the REH restrictions in their model 
gave quite negative results, so that both REH and Structural neutrality 
were rejected. 
No conclusive answershave been found yet. Even tests that are. not negative 
for NCME don't say much. Many statistical models are compatible with 
the time series observations (cf Sargent 1976). The danger is, to 
quote Harry Johnson (1972, p. 51) that 'testing of hypotheses is 
frequently a euphemism for obtaining plausible numbers to provide 
ceremonial adequacy for a theory chosen and defended on a priori 
grounds'. Cases must be studied where changes in policy alter the 
part of monetary growth that is expected, in order to see whether 
the relationship with prices and output is thereby affected. In 
other words, it is necessary to test for the invariance of alternative 
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models across regimes (cf Cagan 1980, p. 828). An endeavour to 
identify distinct periods across which changes in the regime of monetary 
policy occurred, was made by Neftci and Sargent (1978). Such changes 
were found to have taken place in 1929 and 1964. They then went on 
to test two models. First a model in which a feedback rule for the 
money supply minimizes the variance of national- income around trend. 
Such a model will dominate a rule without feedback, such as a constant 
money growth rule, if the model is invariant across regimes. Secondly, 
a model was tested in which the behaviour of output is independent of 
the systematic part of the feedback rule for the money supply. If 
this model would be invariant across regimes there would obviously be 
neutrality. Again, the tests were not conclusive, though they seemed 
to be more negative for policy activists than for neutrality adherents. 
A somewhat less comprehensive testing procedure concerns one aspect 
of NCME, namely that nominal shocks will affect real aggregates if 
economie agents have incomplete information. Countries with widely 
fluctuating exogenous shocks then will, according to Alberro (1981, 
p. 239) have a more vertical Phillips curve as their inhabitants 
sharpen their instrumental to differentiate between real and nominal 
shocks. There should be a positive correlation between Phillips curve 
slopes and the Standard deviations of the exogenous shocks, which 
was corroborated by data of 49 countries over the period 1953-1969, 
six of which had highly erratic aggregate demands. 
The upshot of NCME is that consistent restrictive monetary policies 
could bring inflation down without much cost in the form of unemploy-
ment. Evidence against this proposition is provided by Eckstein 
(1981), based upon simulations with a large scale model of the U.S., 
the 800-equation DRI model. He found a very great resistance of 
factor prices to demand management, mainly because long-term expecta-
tions appear to be formed over a period considerably longer than a 
year (Eckstein 1981, pp. 60-62, 79). 
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8. NCME and market clearing 
Models which contain rational expectations are often characterized 
by market clearing, though not of the Walrasian tatonnement type, 
because the assumption of full information .is not made. Markets 
clear under the usual homogeneity assumptions, expected money is 
neutral and monetary policy is near-impotent. In general, however, 
multi-period contracts or lagged variables make the policy ineffec-
tiveness conclusion invalid, as even McCallum (1979c,, p. 242) must 
admit. But McCallum found support with R.J. Barro. Barro (1977b) 
argued that contracts which fix nominal wages for more than one 
period are suboptimal and that there is, therefore, no solid economie 
rationale for the presumption that this kind of contract is written. 
There may be, however, a rationale for introducing wage contracts in 
a model that specifies that quantities will be determined precisely 
as they would if there were spot markets or fully indexed contracts. 
Wage contracts in such a case are a kind of insurance policy, with 
employers guaranteeing employees a certain level of nominal wages for 
a certain period of time. The volume of employment will always be 
at the point where the marginal product of labour is equal to the 
marginal value of time, which then may differ grom the actual real 
wage level. Employment determination is divorced from perceived 
monetary shocks in this way and feedback monetary rules would be 
superfluous and ineffective. Any divergence of actual real wages 
from the real wage level that would, in a spot market, clear the 
labour market only has significance for ex post income distribution. 
Against this Fischer (1977b) argues that Barro-type contracts do not 
exist in practice. One reason may be moral hazard, as there will be 
many occasions where it would pay one of the parties not to fulfill 
their part of the obligation (nl. either to provide labour at less 
than the equilibrium real wage or to pay more than the equilibrium 
real wage level). Another reason may be that the costs of writing and 
monitoring Barro-type contracts are too large. A satisfying theory 
of wage behaviour does not yet exist (Fischer 1977b, p. 321). Fischer 
(1977d, p. 204) admits that, if the monetary authorities attempted to 
exploit the existing structure of contracts to produce behaviour far 
different from that envisaged when the contracts were drawn up, this 
would likely lead to the reopening of contracts and possibly to a 
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new structure of contracts. 
There need also be no instantaneous market clearing if there is 
oligopolistic pricing. With oligopolistic pricing, prices are 
determined by long-run minimum average costs up to a mark-up 
reflecting entry-preventing considerations, coupled with some lag in 
the adjustment of prices to costs. Demand shocks then will first 
influence output and employment before influencing wages and prices 
(Modigliani 1977, p. 7). McCallum, however, not easily defeated, 
refers to the M.I.T. - Penn-Social Science Research Council 
econometrie model of the U.S. where there are oligopolistic pricing 
and lags in the adjustment of costs into prices. The NCME view on 
policy ineffectiveness does not hold, but only, as McCallum shows, 
because of the formulation of the aggregate supply curve, as aggregate 
supply is not governed entirely by relations among real variables. 
If this 'defect', is corrected, the NCME view again h'olds, given 
rational expectations (McCallum, 1979a). Which does not prove that 
such an amended model is a fair representation of reality. 
Hahn (1980a) has questioned the use of models that essentially 
preclude a priori the raison dTêtre for macro-economie policies. Hahn 
is opposed to the idea that there is a unique Walrasian rational 
expectations equilibrium to which any actual economy is always 
tending (Hahn 1982b, p. 104). The rational expectations world is 
one without quantity constraints (Hahn 1982b, pp. 45-46). But in the 
real world there are quantity constraints. If unemployed workers 
offer their labour services below the going wage rate they may still 
be refused employment. Because of information problems, employers may 
well rationally prefer to hire at a fixed wage and to ration the jobs 
that they offer. An expansionary monetary policy can be effective in 
a quantity-constrained economy even with rational expectations. 
Economie agents may then well hold that with a higher money stock the 
demand for goods will be higher. It is then not impossible that there 
exists a rational expectations equilibrium with higher real income, 
higher employment, higher cash balances and possibly slightly lower 
interest rates, with agents correctly anticipating government 
policy (see also Tobin 1980a, p. 45, and Begg 1982 para 6.4 for a 
model without continuous market clearing but with rational 
27 
expectations and conventional results for stabilization policy). 
After all, in the real world firms are price setters who set output 
targets on the basis of expected sales. Deviations of output from 
trend result from faulty sales forecasts, not from incorrect price 
expectations (cf Forman 1980, p. 38). The point is that REH-models 
are essentially one-good-models, that don't allow heterogeneity (see 
below). Furthermore, in reality there is no all-embracing Walrasian 
market, but there are many markets, which are interconnected to 
varying degrees. Decisions made in one market during one period may 
have consequences for other markets during the next period, and 
economie agents in any market are constrained by conditions prevailing 
in other markets. If, e.g., a negative demand shock occurs, suppliers 
may well know that they should lower their prices, but they cannot 
count on their own suppliers to lower the prices of the inputs they 
use. A demand shock therefore first works out in the form of 
quantity signals and only after a period of time prices will react. 
The economy is a very complicated system of input-output relations and 
communication and coordination are costly (Gordon, 1981, p. 526). 
There is as yet no theoretically completely satisfying . model which 
explains why some markets (fixprice markets) do not clear instantaneous-
'ly, while others (flexprice markets) do; at least no elegant model. 
The solution probably must be sought along the lines set out by Okun. 
According to Okun, continuous market clearing implies the universali-
ty of organized auction markets, which resemble the Walrasian model. 
But such markets can exist only for products that are standardized and 
defined so well (at such low cost) that they can be viewed as 
homogeneous by aprospective buyer placing orders through a broker. 
Markets for other products, for heterogeneous goods, are search or 
customer markets. Sellers in these markets are price makers, and 
therefore quantity takers. A demand shock will initially alter 
quantities and leave prices unchanged. Sellers have an incentive not 
to change prices frequently. They have a sort of implicit contract 
with their customers. Shopping is costly. If customers can be sure 
of the prices advertised by their suppliers, they will return for 
repeat buys. 
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With frequent price adjustments, customers will spend more time 
shopping around, so it is in the interest of both seller and buyer 
to enter into an implicit contract. In the same way, it is in the 
interest of both the employer and the employee to guarantee a certain 
wage level for some period of time, in spite of Barro. The employer 
cannot be sure that prospective new entrants are of the same quality 
and they have, moreover, invested in their employees; for the 
employees, job search is costly (see Okun 1980, pp. 823-824 and Okun 
1981, esp. Ch. 4; see also Hahn 1982d, p. 288). One might ask why 
there should be no contracts that fix both wages and hours per 
week worked. Poole (1976, pp. 486-487) answers that such contracts do 
not contain a mechanism to reallocate labour. Under such contracts 
firms may therefor offer lower wages than under fixed-wage only 
contracts. Expected incomes may well be enough higher under fixed-
wage contracts than under wages-and-hours worked, or tenure, contracts 
to persuade most employees to fore™o the security of tenure. Tenure 
contracts seem to be more comon in Europe than in the U.S. and the 
conclusion that European employees are more risk-averse than their 
American counterparts does not seem to be farfetched. 
Empirical evidence does indeed suggest that not only wage rates but 
also home market prices of manufactured products tend to be stable for 
months or even years at a time. Silberston only sees exceptions to 
this rule when raw materials with widely fluctuating prices form a 
high proportion of costs (Silberston 1973, p. 1031). 
It can be argued that a monetary economy is characterized by just the 
properties that neoclassical and monetarist, let alone NCME models 
leave out, such as information and other transaction costs and 
economies of scale that preclude perfect competition (cf Miller, 
Nelson and Supel, 1976, p. 62). Doubt may be expressed as to monetary 
policy rules developed in the context of what are essentially non-
monetary economies (cf Miller, 1976, p. 100). NCME one-good models 
describe economies where money is non-essential. 
29 
9 • Critiques of rational expectations 
i. 2§e_of_the_correct_model 
KEH says that economie agents process information according to a 
correct model of the economy and make unbiased estimates of its 
coefficients (B.M. Friedman, 1979, p. 38). McCallum (1979c, p. 241) 
argues that an extreme REH would be that all agents act as if they 
knew the true structures of the economy including the policy feedback 
rule. A weaker version is that expectations differ from the fully 
rational values by a random term uncorrelated with available data. 
McCallum admits that such an assumption is literally untrue, but then, 
he says, so is every behavioral relation in every formal economie 
model. In parentheses, this can be defended as an 'as if' approach, 
which serves as an economie explanation of empirically found 
regularities, but which cannot itself be tested (cf Begg, 1982, 
pp. 130, 254). McCallum sees no reason to believe that such an 
assumption is terribly inaccurate at the macrolevel. Moreover, the 
alternatives are unattractive7 because they require the assumed 
existence of some particular pattern of systematic expectations 
errors. This is improbable. People using the correct model would 
make profits at the expense of less well-informed people. This should 
answer the objections voiced by, among others, Kaldor and Trevithick 
(1981, p. 15) that the assumption of rational expectations presupposes 
the correct understanding of the working of the economy by all economie 
agents, which can only be called metaphysics. People using the 
correct model should outperform less well-informed people. But 
even if that is true, one cannot be sure that this will drive the 
system towards a reactional expectations equilibrium, as long as 
the adjustment mechanism is not given (Maddock and Carter, 1982, 
p. 45). Meanwhile, firms are not immediately driven out of existence 
by wrong price forecasts and for consumers the persistent use of 
poor forecasts will not be disastrous at all (Miller, Nelson and 
Supel, 1976, p. 57). 
Even if the system moves in the direction of a rational expectations 
equilibrium, such a movement may take a very long time. Now the 
system is subject to continuous shocks and economie agents need a 
learning period to discern the true model5 
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but with coritinuous shocks one never gets out of the leaming period 
(cf B.M. Friedman, 1979, pp. 24, 36, 39). According to Shiller 
(1978, p. 39) one may need 15 to 20 quarters after a sudderi major 
change in policy to have enough observations for a regression of 
any value, when using a number of variables to forecast a particular 
economie variable. If economie agents subsequently apply their 
revised expectations mechanism, this in itself changes the structure 
of the economy again, which brings forth the need for another 15-to 
20-quarters learning period. 
There may be an even more serious problem. It was assumed all the 
time that there is a true model of the economy and that there exists 
a unique rational expectations equilibrium. A true model implies 
that there exists such a thing as an objective probability distribution 
of future events. This can only be true if the underlying 'true' model 
of the economy is constant over time and the economy's behaviour is 
characterized by repeatability, so that expectation errors are 
nothing but white noise and there exists only risk, not uncertainty 
(cf Bausor 1983). The 'true' structure of the system is not indepen-
dent of expectations; therefore, there is not one, unique 'true' 
structure. If, e.g., a majority of investors expect that the economy 
will be buoyant and act on that expectation, the economy will be 
buoyant, while, if they expect it to go the other way, it will go the 
other way. In such cases of self-fulfillingprophecies there is no •< 
objective probability distribution that can be exploited by people 
whose expectations are rational. In such a situation we are left with 
Buiter's opinion that strict lluth-rational expectations can be viewed 
as an acceptable representation of private (and public) agents' 
forecasting behaviour only in the tranquility of a long-run steady 
state (Buiter, 1980, p. 38). 
REH and NCME adherents admit that economie agents may have some 
information problems. Their use of this fact is somewhat ambiguous. 
On the one hand, they tend to play down the importance of incomplete 
information. Much information is easily available from newspapers 
and magazines, provided by specialized agencies such as government 
bureaus of statistics. 
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On the other hand, incomplete information, which is, moreover, unevenly 
distributed, is often seen as a cause of economie fluctuations. As 
Okun (1980, p. 819) rightly observes, f irms and households operate in 
both product and factor markets at essentially the same time and it 
is implausible that important information would be too costly for 
rational agents to acquire. 
iii. NoBiHSÏSHÊSêS3. 
It has been argued above that there may be no unique rational 
expectations equilibrium. Self-fulfilling prophecies cannot be ex-
cluded (Fischer, 1979, p. 248). Mathematically, rational expectations 
models often involve difference equations, which, if not degenerate, 
have an infinite number of possible solutions. For instance, today's 
price of a good as well as today's expected price may depend not 
only on today's money supply, but also on the expectation of to-
morrow's price, P^.,..!-- Next period's price then depends on next 
period's expectation of price two periods hence and next period's 
money supply, and so on. The solution depends on expectations of 
variables for all periods to infinity (cf Shiller, 1978, pp. 23-25). 
It may be true that, as McCallum (1983) notes, non-uniqueness is not 
properly attributable to REH, but is a general feature of dynamic 
models involving expectations, but that does not really solve the 
problem. 
Non-uniqueness may also arise from money being neither neutral nor 
super-neutral. Usually, demand and supply of real variables are 
supposed to be homogeneous of degree zero in the money supply and 
current and expected prices. With homogeneity of degree zero economie 
agents can safely predict prices to be proportional to the expected 
money stock, or inflation to be proportional to the expected rate 
of growth of the money supply. But the neutrality supposition is 
quite strong (cf Visser, 1980, pp. 185-189). In an economy with 
internal debt denominated in money, changes in the price level may 
have non-neutral distribution effects. Inflation may lead to a 
higher capital intensity because of the Mundell-Tobin effect, which 
may cause higher wages and a concomitant increase in the labour supply. 
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All this makes monetary policy, even if foreseen, non-neutral and 
impairs the uniqueness proposition (cf Hahn, 1980a, p. 2, 
Hadjimichalakis, 1982, p. 396). 
10. Positive contributions of REH 
As with any new and seemingly useful concept, extravagant claims have 
been made for REH. The role of rational expectations in economie 
theory must be much smaller than claimed by the like of McCallum. 
It remains, none the less, a useful concept. First of all, there are 
markets that in effect function like Walrasian auction markets. 
Markets for financial assets and future markets for agricultural 
commodities and primary metals are as close as possible to the textbook 
case of competitive, atomistic markets. They are characterized by 
relatively small transactions and storage cost, highly standardized 
commodities and, therefore, negligible information costs, and a 
large number of market participants. 
Furthermore, REH focuses attention on the change in behaviour brought 
about by government policy measures. Economie agents will, e.g., 
expect inflation and act accordingly if the government follows 
expansionary policies. This means that parameter estimates derived 
under old policies are inappropriate in simulating new policies, 
because account must be taken of the reactions of economie actors to 
policy changes, 
1 1. Conclus ions 
NCME, that is, the combination of REH with continuously clearing markets, 
is an artifact which is not of much help in analysing the real world. 
For one thing, it denies the possibility of involuntary unemployment. 
This is simply counterfactual. As Tobin remarks: 'Why do people 
report themselves as unemployed if all that has happened is pre-
ference for leasure at ruling real wages?' (Tobin 1980d, pp. 42-43). 
In fact, it describes an economy where money is inessential. In a 
full-equilibrium NCME-economy, with a complete set of future markets, 
there is no reason for money to exist (cf. Hadjimichalakis, 1982, 
p. 390). 
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NCME assumes away all the real-world problems studied by Keynes, 
which follow from the less-than-perfeet coordination of the decisions 
of economie agents, i.e. the absence of the Walrasian auctioneer. 
REH in itself is less objectionable. It neglects the fact that we live 
in a world of nonrepetitive events, for which there simply does not 
exist a probability distribution. In other words, we live in a world 
characterized not by risk, but by uncertainty, by Keynes's 'dark 
forces of time and ignorance' (cf Kregel, 1981, p. 570, Lucas, 1977, 
p. 15, Keynes, 1936, p. 161). It is, however, a useful approximation 
of some kinds of markets and may even be combined with non-clearing 
markets. But even in those cases the empirical evidence is not al-
together positive. Arrow (1982, p. 4) notes that there are quite 
sizable price fluctuations on future and securities markets. In 
his view prices should, if participants behaved rationally, change 
only when there is new information, and the change on any one day 
should be small, as most new information adds only a little to 
exis.ting information. Iloreover, he cites evidence from psychological 
experiments conducted by A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (Arrow, 1982, 
p. 5) which shows that people judge the likelihood of a future event 
by the similarity of the present evidence to it. There is a tendency 
to ignore both price information and the quality of the present 
evidence (e.g., size sample) and to underestimate uncertainties. 
So there may be a useful, though limited, role for REH, but NCME must, 
in my view, be rejected. 
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